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After reports of the intentional release of Bacillus anthracis in the United States, epidemiologists, laborato-
rians, and clinicians around the world were called upon to respond to widespread political and public con-
cerns. To respond to inquiries from other countries regarding anthrax and bioterrorism, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention established an international team in its Emergency Operations Center.
From October 12, 2001, to January 2, 2002, this team received 130 requests from 70 countries and 2 terri-
tories. Requests originated from ministries of health,  international organizations, and physicians and
included subjects ranging from laboratory procedures and clinical evaluations to assessments of environ-
mental and occupational health risks. The information and technical support provided by the international
team helped allay fears, prevent unnecessary antibiotic treatment, and enhance laboratory-based surveil-
lance for bioterrorism events worldwide.  
mmediately following reports of the intentional release of
Bacillus anthracis in the United States in October 2001,
public health professionals around the world were called upon
to respond to widespread political and public concerns. Spe-
cific threats, hoaxes, and incidents in other countries directly
affected U.S. institutions and citizens, as well as expatriate
U.S. government employees, businessmen, journalists, and
travelers. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) established an international team in its Emergency
Operations Center to respond to inquiries from other countries
regarding anthrax and bioterrorism.
Methods
The international team included physicians, microbiolo-
gists, epidemiologists, and other public health officials with
expertise in international affairs and infectious diseases. Team
members were fluent in several languages. From October 12,
2001, to January 2, 2002, the team provided rapid feedback
and support in response to requests for assistance on bioterror-
ism-related topics. The team was available for consultation by
telephone and e-mail, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The team
electronically disseminated documents on anthrax and bioter-
rorism preparedness and collaborated with the World Health
Organization (WHO) and its regional offices to facilitate
exchanging relevant information. 
Requests for assistance were classified into four general
categories: laboratory-related issues, general bioterrorism
information, environmental and occupational concerns, and
bioterrorism preparedness. Depending on the nature of the
request, the team sought assistance from other CDC experts.
The level of support provided to various countries for spe-
cific requests was divided into two categories: high or
medium. High, or technical, support included one or more of
the following: testing clinical and environmental or nonclini-
cal specimens and isolates, arranging for specimens and iso-
lates to be tested at a reference laboratory, coordinating with
CDC staff in-country to provide on-site consultation and assis-
tance, and providing reagents for performing microbiological
tests. Medium, or informational support, included telephone or
e-mail consultation regarding bioterrorism, laboratory meth-
ods, and preparedness. 
Results
The international team received 130 requests for assistance
from 70 countries and 2 territories during the period October
12, 2001, to January 2, 2002. An average of 3.2 requests per
day (with a peak of 9 requests on October 19) were received
by e-mail (55.4%) and telephone (44.6%) (Figure 1). Forms of
support provided to other countries included consultation
regarding laboratory methods for isolation and identification
of B. anthracis, clinical and epidemiologic support, and policy
and preparedness. Of the 130 requests, 54 (41.5%) were labo-
ratory related; 51 (39.2%) were general requests for bioterror-
ism information; 14 (10.8%) were for environmental or
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occupational health guidelines; and 11 (8.5%) concerned
developing bioterrorism-preparedness plans. Ninety-three
(71.5%) of the requests were from persons or agencies affili-
ated with Ministries of Health; 15 (11.5%) were from other
public health or medical professionals; 13 (10.0%) were from
private citizens; and 9 (6.9%) were from international organi-
zations such as WHO and the Pan American Health Organiza-
tion. Requests were not evenly distributed by region. Europe
and Latin America/the Caribbean each accounted for 25.4% of
the total requests, followed by Asia (22%) and Africa (15%). 
Of the 70 countries and 2 territories, 55 (76.4%) received
informational support or telephone or e-mail consultation
regarding bioterrorism events or preparedness (Figure 2). The
remaining 17 (23.6%) received a high or technical level of
support, including testing specimens at a Laboratory Response
Network member reference laboratory (n=12). Digital images
of suspected B. anthracis isolates and cases were submitted by
e-mail, which enabled laboratory and clinical experts to review
images of suspected cases worldwide and provide rapid guid-
ance (Figure 3). All isolates and cases from images sent were
subsequently found to be negative. 
Four isolates from outside the United States were con-
firmed as B. anthracis. Three of these isolates were cultured
from mail sent by the U.S. Department of State to U.S. embas-
sies in Lima, Peru (two), and Vienna, Austria (one). These
three isolates were indistinguishable from all other U.S. out-
break isolates by molecular subtyping by multilocus variable
number of tandem repeats typing. An additional isolate, recov-
ered by the Chilean National Institute of Public Health from a
letter to a private physician in Chile, was a different subtype
from those in the U.S. outbreak. The source of this isolate is
being investigated. 
The team’s active role concentrated on information dis-
semination and collaboration with WHO. Documents on
anthrax and bioterrorism were prepared and disseminated elec-
tronically to all CDC international assignees (41 countries), to
epidemiologists and laboratorians affiliated with the Training
Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions
Network (TEPHINET, 33 countries), and to the WHO Global
Salmonella Surveillance List Serve (Global Salm-Surv, 106
countries). Electronic dissemination allowed rapid distribution
and availability of contact information for the team. In addi-
tion, the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR)
published a short statement about the team’s activities that
described assistance to other countries and directed questions
regarding bioterrorism-related issues outside the United States
to the team (1). Collaboration with WHO regional offices
included the development and support of a training course on
the management of suspected exposures to anthrax spores (2).
Representatives from 14 countries attended the course, which
was conducted in Bangkok in December 2001 and was spon-
sored by the CDC International Emerging Infections Program
Figure 1. Requests for assistance to international team of the Emer-
gency Operations Center, October 12, 2001–January 2, 2002 (n=130).
Figure 2. International response: level of support
provided.BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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in Thailand and the WHO headquarters Southeast Asia
Regional Office. In addition, the international team worked
with WHO to develop a database of laboratories capable of
serving as anthrax reference laboratories in various countries
throughout the world.
Discussion
Any suspected bioterrorism event has immediate global
implications, no matter who the intended target or where the
event occurs. This global impact is particularly true for com-
municable diseases such as smallpox. However, because of
international trade, travel, and social connectedness, the same
principle applies to less easily transmitted communicable dis-
eases such as anthrax. More than 4,000 threat letters were
tested in public health laboratories in Europe in the month
after the first report of intentionally contaminated mail in the
United States, and all surveyed national public health institu-
tions took extraordinary measures to improve bioterrorism
preparedness (3).
In countries throughout the world, threat letters caused a
shift in resources from traditional public health concerns to
national security concerns. This shift represents a particular
challenge for developing countries with chronically scarce
resources for public health. Therefore, additional resources,
particularly for the health sector of developing countries, are
needed to address future threats. In many countries, strength-
ening the public health surveillance and response capacity for
naturally occurring emerging infectious diseases is the most
efficient means to provide a critical early warning system for
intentionally released biologic agents and a defense against
their further spread.
Public health agencies need to be able to exchange infor-
mation rapidly across international borders to keep pace with
events and make critical medical and public health decisions.
Public health agencies must also keep pace with worldwide
media coverage to minimize the potential for misguided public
reaction. In the United States and other countries, many per-
sons who were exposed to suspected anthrax-containing mate-
rials were told to not start or to discontinue antibiotic
chemoprophylaxis after anthrax exposure was ruled out by
testing at public health reference laboratories and by further
epidemiologic investigations (4). Information and technical
support provided by the international team helped allay fears,
prevent unnecessary antibiotic treatment, and enhance labora-
tory-based surveillance for bioterrorism events worldwide. 
The operations of the international team were not without
difficulty. Responding rapidly in different languages to coun-
tries in different time zones proved to be a challenge. In addi-
tion, the team was not always able to provide rapid technical
assistance because of the need for review and clearance of
documents containing new scientific information.  Despite
strict adherence to regulations governing the transport of
infectious agents, shipment of suspected isolates of B. anthra-
cis from laboratories in one country to reference laboratories
in the United States was complicated by hesitance from ship-
ping companies, air carriers, and national authorities.  In some
cases, the laboratory investigation of suspected exposures was
delayed for several days while consent was sought from higher
authorities and willing shipping companies and air carriers
were identified. 
The largest percentage of requests received by the interna-
tional team were from persons or agencies affiliated with min-
istries of health, reflecting concern about bioterrorism issues at
the national government level. On request, the team also pro-
vided specific information about the events occurring in the
United States, often through referrals to publications and other
materials regularly posted on the CDC website. Information
provided to field epidemiology training programs through
TEPHINET addressed some of these issues proactively and
reduced the overall number of requests (5). Given the essential
role of the public health laboratory in bioterrorism prepared-
ness and response (6), information provided proactively to lab-
oratories through the WHO Global Salm-Surv listserv may
also have reduced the number of requests. 
Rapid, reliable access to the Internet is an extremely useful
tool for connecting public health agencies and laboratories and
should be universally promoted. Digital cameras are an eco-
nomical means of capturing clinical and laboratory images for
Internet transmission and can greatly enhance communication
about suspected cases or specific etiologic agents of infectious
diseases.  Nonclassified commercial laboratory reagents and
protocols for isolating and identifying B. anthracis and other
bioterrorism agents should be widely available to national
Figure 3. Suspected cutaneous anthrax lesion from a patient in the
United Kingdom. Photos like this, transmitted by e-mail, enabled clinical
experts to review images of suspected cases worldwide and provide
rapid assistance.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1059
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public health reference laboratories. Through its collaborating
centers, WHO has already begun to establish a worldwide net-
work of reference laboratories capable of isolating, identify-
ing, and confirming bioterrorism agents; WHO will continue
to play a critical role in global coordination of outbreak sur-
veillance and response. In addition, during the World Health
Assembly of May 2002, the 191 member states agreed to a res-
olution recognizing that a deliberate release of biological
agents could have serious public health implications and jeop-
ardize public health achievements of the past decades (7).
In the long term, strengthening the capabilities of national
public health agencies and laboratories to recognize and
respond to potential bioterrorist events and agents will also
build capacity for recognition and response to naturally occur-
ring outbreaks. Ensuring connectivity between these national
public health agencies and reference laboratories worldwide is
critical to improving global preparedness for emerging infec-
tious diseases, whether or not they result from the deliberate
release of a bioterrorism agent.
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